This paper shows that about 70 percent of the variance of the yearly change in the world private financial saving rate can be explained by lagged changes in world stock and housing prices for the sample period 1982-2013. The results suggest that increased fluctuations in asset prices since 1995 have led to increased fluctuations in the world private financial saving rate. Wealth effects on private demand appear to be large.
Introduction
The results in this paper suggest that changes in world asset prices have large effects on changes in the world private financial saving rate. Annual data on the world private financial saving rate, denoted sp * t , are constructed for the 1980-2013 period. It will be seen that fluctuations in this rate are much larger after 1995 than before. It is also the case that fluctuations in world stock and housing prices are much larger after 1995 than before. Regression results show that about 70 percent * Cowles Foundation, Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8281. Phone: 203-980-0646; e-mail: ray.fair@yale.edu; website: fairmodel.econ.yale.edu. I am indebted to William Brainard for helpful discussions.
there is an increase in its net foreign assets, and conversely if its current account is in deficit. The sum of the current accounts of all countries in the world is zero after converting the current accounts to a common currency. The financial saving of a country's government, SG it , is total government revenue minus total government expense. If a government's financial saving is positive, there is an increase in the government's net financial assets, and conversely if the government's financial saving is negative. The financial saving of a country's private sector, SP it , is S it − SG it . Because the sum of S it across all countries is zero after converting to a common currency, the sum of SP it is equal to minus the sum of SG it after converting each to a common currency. If the sum of SP it after converting to a common currency is positive, this means there is a net flow of funds from the world's private sector to the world's government sector, and conversely if the sum is negative. sp * t is the sum of SP it divided by world GDP, where all variables are converted to U.S. dollars. This paper is concerned with financial saving-flows of funds among sectors and countries. Financial saving does not distinguish between consumption and investment expenditures. The financial saving of a sector or country is total revenue minus total expenditures, including expenditures that are classified in the national income and product accounts as investment expenditures. 1 Consider the GDP definition for a country, Y it = C it + I it + G it + EX it − IM it , where Y it is GDP, C it is consumption, I it is investment, G it is government spending, EX it is the level of exports, and IM it is the level of imports. S it as used in this paper is Y it − C it − I it − G it , namely the country's current account, EX it − IM it . A country's saving, on the other hand, which will be denoted SAV it , is Y it −C it −G it , so S it = SAV it − I it . In this paper SAV it will be called "saving," and S it , SP it , and SG it will be called "financial saving."
Much of the literature on saving behavior is concerned with SAV it . It is important to realize that a country's current account, S it , can be large relative to its GDP even though it has a low saving rate (because I it is small). If one is talking about which countries are financing, say, a large U.S. current account deficit, it is not necessarily countries with high saving rates. By definition all current account deficits are financed by current account surpluses (because the sum of S it across countries is zero), but this in itself says nothing about which countries have high saving rates and which have low saving rates. Bernanke's speech is in fact not really concerned with a global saving glut, but with the large U.S. current account deficit. He discusses a number of possible reasons for the large U.S. deficit and for the surpluses of some other countries.
None of this discussion requires the concept of a global saving glut.
Obstfeld ( This paper is not concerned with current account imbalances. Instead, the world is divided into two sectors-private and government-and the financial saving of the world's private sector is examined, not the financial flows among countries.
There is an interesting literature showing that after taking into account capital gains and losses on net foreign assets, the change in a country's net foreign assets can be quite different from the country's current account-see, for example, Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Obstfeld (2010) . The financial flow data used in this paper do not include capital gains and losses, so these valuation issues are not taken into account.
There is finally a literature explaining the private saving of various countries, both across time and across countries-see, for example, Maason, Bayoumi, and Samiei (1998) and Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000) . This latter ref-
erence provides a good summary of previous work. In this literature the private saving rate is regressed on a number of variables, generally using panel data sets.
Again, if the right hand side variables are exogenous, these regressions can be considered reduced form regressions. Government saving is usually one of the right hand side variables, which seems problematic. If, say, there is a negative shock to consumption, thus increasing private saving, this is likely to lead to a fall in output and income, which will lead to a fall in tax revenue and possibly an increase in some kinds of government spending. Government saving will thus fall.
Government saving is an endogenous variable, and it is not clear that it should be on the right hand side of an equation explaining private saving. At any rate, this
is not an issue in this paper. Total private financial saving in the world is equal to the negative of total government financial saving in the world, and the latter is certainly not an exogenous variable explaining the former.
Data Collection
Except for the stock-price and housing-price data, all the data used in this paper were taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS Nominal GDP for a country, Y it , was taken from the National Accounts section.
It was one of the following five variables: 99b.., 99b.c, 99b.d, 99bp., and 99bac.
Y it is in units of the country's currency, and it was converted to U.S. dollars by
The private financial saving of a country in U.S. dollars is taken to be:
The country's private financial saving rate is taken to be:
The country's government financial saving rate is taken to be:
The data are thus constructed from only a few IFS variables, at most five per country. Data were collected for every country possible. Prior to 1980 there were many missing observations, and 1980 was taken to be the first year considered.
The last year is 2013. In a few cases there were small gaps of a year or two in the SG it data for a country, and in these cases values for SG it were constructed by in- added. These countries are also listed in Table 1 . In each group the countries are listed in the order they appear in the IFS data. What is of interest in this paper is the sum of SP $ it across all countries divided by the sum of Y $ it , denoted sp * t . As a check on the data, it is informative to look at the sum of S$ it across all countries divided by the sum of Y $ it , denoted s * t . This ratio should be zero, and it is of interest to see how far away from zero it is. sp * t and s * t are examined in the next section. The world government financial saving rate, denoted sg * t , is s * t − sp * t . Since (as will be seen) s * t is approximately zero, sg * t is approximately −sp * t . Without measurement error it would be exactly −sp * t . The discussion in this paper focuses on sp * t , but it obviously also pertains to sg * t with the sign reversed. Table 2 summarizes the data collection and the construction of the variables. Individual Construction:
World Construction:
N is the number of countries.
3 sp * t and s * t Table 3 presents values of sp * t and s * t for three sets of countries. Observations begin in 1980 for the first set (group 1), 1990 for the second set (groups 1 and 2), and 2000 for the third set (groups 1, 2, and 3). It is important to note that the summation for the first set is always over only countries in that set-countries are not added as observations become available for them. The values for sp * t and s * t for, say, 1990 for the first set are thus different than those for the second set because the summation is different. Remember that in principle s * t should be zero for each year.
As a check on the data, consider first in Table 3 Table 3 . The values in Table 3 are thus of the same magnitude as the IMF values, which suggests that most of the world that matters for this purpose is being captured. It will be useful to examine plots of some of these variables. For the other regressions U SHOU SE t−1 is used as the housing price variable. It is taken as a proxy for world housing prices, which Figure 4 shows is a reasonable approximation. Figure 6 plots sp * t and U SHOU SE t lagged one year. Comparing Figures 5 and 6 , the large increases in housing prices did not begin until the late 1990s, whereas the large increases in stock prices began in the mid 1990s. Also, housing prices did not fall in the early 2000s, contrary to stock prices. in U.S. stock and housing prices. The results in Table 4 will thus be interpreted as roducing consistent coefficient estimates, subject to the nonlinear issue discussed in the previous footnote.
Equations (1), (2), and (3) in Table 4 Equation (4) is equation (2) with the spliced version of the world housing price variable replacing the U.S. housing price variable. Remember that the world variable tends to lag the U.S. variable by a year, and it was spliced from 1997 back using the U.S. variable lagged one year. It is thus entered with a subscript t in Table 4 , although it is in effect lagged a year. The world variable does not work as well as the U.S. variable. The R 2 has dropped from 0.724 to 0.647. One interpretation of this result is that the U.S. variable is a better measure of world housing prices than is the world variable derived from the OECD price-to-rent ratios.
Equation ( 
Implications
Given from Table 4 A theory consistent with the results in Table 4 is that world asset-price changes like stock-price changes affect world consumption through wealth effects and affect world investment through cost of capital effects. The simple life cycle model, for example, says that an unanticipated increase in wealth leads, other things being equal, to an increase in consumption. According to this theory, the large fluctuations in sp * t since 1995 are driven in part by the large fluctuations in world asset prices during this period. This theory relies on asset-price changes being exogenous to the households' and firms' decision making processes: asset prices change for some reason independent of these processes, and after the asset-price changes, households and firms respond.
Another possible theory is one in which there is an exogenous change in households' and firms' expectations of some future variable, like future productivity, and this leads them to both bid asset prices up or down and to change consumption and investment. If productivity is expected to be higher in the future than originally thought, this would lead households to bid asset prices up and increase consumption at the same time. Lantz and Sarte (2001) have a general equilibrium model in which this effect is at work. In this theory asset-price changes do not cause consumption and investment changes, since all three are determined by changes in expectations. In this case it does not make sense, for example, to talk about the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth.
There are, of course, other variables in the reduced form equation for sp * t . These are likely to include current exogenous fiscal-policy variables and various lagged endogenous variables. If, for example, the monetary policy rule for a country has the lagged value of the country's unemployment rate as an explanatory variable, the lagged value of the unemployment rate will be in the reduced form equation for sp * t . This being said, the best explanation of sp * t is likely to come not from estimating a reduced form equation but from estimating a multicountry structural model and then solving for sp * t . What is dramatic about the results in Table 4 is that so much of the variance of ∆sp * t can be explained by simply the lagged changes in stock prices and housing prices.
If asset-price changes (or forces like changes in productivity expectations that drive asset-price changes) are essentially unpredictable, then the present results suggest that much of the change in sp * t is unpredictable. In a complete structural model some of the change in sp * t would be predictable because it would depend on various exogenous and lagged endogenous variables, including various exogenous fiscal-policy variables. The main message here is that so much of the change in sp * t seems to be driven by (unpredictable) changes in asset prices.
If the forces behind asset-price changes are largely unpredictable, this does not necessarily mean that policy makers have no ability to affect these changes. Take the huge boom in U.S. stock prices between 1995 and 2000. Many people thought at the time that this boom was a stock market bubble, but this did not appear to be the Fed's view. Alan Greenspan talked about a new age of productivity, and the Fed lowered interest rates during certain bad times in the stock market. 4 The view among many was that there was a "Greenspan put" regarding stock Therefore, to the extent that the large fluctuations in sp * since 1995 are undesirable, policy actions or lack thereof may bear part of the blame. 4 Perhaps the most dramatic Fed action in this period was the surprise lowering of the federal funds rate on October 15, 1998. The U.S. stock market was down from its highs in late September, and the Fed cited unsettled conditions in financial markets as one of the reasons for the decrease. This resulted in a huge increase in stock prices after the announcement.
Conclusion
Since the world government financial saving rate, sg * t , is −sp * t aside from measurement error, the above discussion about sp * t also pertains to sg * t with the sign reversed. Under the first theory an increase in world asset prices stimulates consumption and investment and leads to a fall in sp * t and thus a rise in sg * t . The main reason for the rise in sg * t is the increase in taxes due to the more expansive world economy. Under this theory the behavioral changes caused by the increase in asset prices are increases in private consumption and investment. Governments play a passive role. sg * t changes because taxes change. It could be that an increase in asset prices leads to a decrease in discretionary government spending and/or an increase in discretionary tax rates, but this is probably quantitatively small. The driving force behind the large government deficits in the world in 2009 is likely the huge fall in world equity and housing prices that led to large decreases in private consumption and investment. Under the second theory the driving force is a change in expectations that led directly to large decreases in asset prices, consumption, and investment.
